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ABSTRACT. The business angel market is changing. Business angels are increasingly 
investing as part of organised and managed angel groups alongside other angels rather than 
on their own. This development has significant implications for research, challenging the 
traditional definition of a business angel, changing the characteristics of investments made by 
business angels, and transforming the way in which the investment process occurs. It also 
challenges the ongoing relevance of the existing body of angel research that has been based 
on studies of individual angels investing on their own. The research community has been 
slow to react to this change. The paper identifies a number of methodological issues and 
research priorities. 
 
Key words: business angels, angel groups, investment decision-making, follow-on investment 
2 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Angel investing has been undergoing a transformation since the late 1990s from a largely 
invisible and atomistic market dominated by individual and small ad hoc groups of investors 
who strive to keep a low profile and rely on word-of-mouth for their investment opportunities 
to a more organised and visible market in which angel groups are becoming increasingly 
significant both in terms of total amount invested and size of investments - typically in the 
£250,000 to £500,000  range that were previously the prerogative of venture capital funds - 
and participating in much larger deals as co-investors in syndicated deals (Mason and 
Harrison, 2015; Mason et al, 2016). These groups are managed, professional in their 
operation (albeit to varying degrees), with established routines for accessing deals, screening 
deals, undertaking due diligence, negotiating and investing. Most use online platforms to 
manage the investment process. As Edelman et al (2017: 397) comment:  “angel groups are 
changing the angel investment landscape.”  
 
Angel groups operate by aggregating the investment capacity of individual high net worth 
individuals (HNWIs). Some groups are member-managed while others are manager-led. This 
individual is often termed the ‘gatekeeper’ (Paul and Whittam, 2010). Their key roles are to 
undertake the initial screening of investment opportunities and to manage investor 
engagement. Groups have a limited and selective membership of angels (typically 20-75 
members but some have over 100 members). There are a variety of organisational models. In 
one common model - the ‘dinner club’ model – members meet regularly to hear pitches by 
entrepreneurs who have been pre-screened by the group’s management team. Another is  the 
‘core-periphery’ model which consists of a tight inner circle of lead investors who provide 
the central decision-making function alongside the ‘gatekeeper’ and lead the group’s 
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investments, and a larger, outer ring of semi-passive investors who are given the opportunity 
to invest alongside these lead investors. Another model involves the coalescing of members 
around an experienced angel who takes the lead role in an investment. Kerr et al (2014) 
describe the investment model of Tech Coast Angels, a well-known angel group in southern 
California.  Some larger groups – such as Tech Coast Angels,  Keiretsu and Go Beyond - 
operate on a Chapter model basis. In this model groups operate in several locations, in some 
cases in more than one country, under the same brand management, but each has its own 
gatekeeper, use standard procedures for generating deal flow, screening and due diligence, 
and run common training sessions, seminars and other events which build collaborate social 
relationships between members across the group.  
 
This changing nature of angel investing has fundamental implications for angel research. As 
recent reviews show (White and Dumay, 2017; Drover et al, 2017; Edelman et al, 2017; 
Wallermoth et al, 2018; Tenca et al, 2018), the research that has been produced over the past 
four decades on which our understanding of angel investing is based  derives from studies of 
solo angels operating independently and below the radar. But with the emergence of group 
investing this established knowledge base may no longer be relevant. For example, it is not 
clear whether angels who are members of angel groups are distinctive in terms of their 
characteristics or investment practices from solo angels. Furthermore, despite the growing 
importance and sophistication of angel groups as providers of capital, there is very little 
evidence on the impact that group membership has on the investment process of individual 
angels (Bonini et al 2018: 593). Research has been slow to respond to the changing nature of 
angel investing (Edelman et al, 2017; Tenca et al, 2018). For example, in their review of 148 
journal papers on business angels published between 1981 and 2015, Tenca et al (2018) 
identify just two papers on angel networks or groups. The literature on angel groups 
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comprises a handful of case studies (mainly written by practitioners) (e.g. May and Simmons, 
2001; May, 2002; Cerullo and Sommer, 2002; Payne and Mccarty, 2002; May and 
O’Halloran, 2003) and just a few scholarly studies (Sudek, 2006; Becker-Blease and Sohl, 
2011; Gregson et al 2013; Carpentier and Suret, 2015; Mason et al, 2016; Croce et al, 2017) 
and some general discussions (Mason, 2006; Sohl, 2007; 2012). 
 
In this paper we reflect on the implications of the emergence of angel groups for research on 
business angels in this new era of organised angel investing. We start by considering the 
implications for how business angels are defined. This is followed by a discussion of data 
sources.  We then discuss the ways in which the investment decision-making process of angel 
groups differs to that of individual angels. Individuals still generally make their own 
investment decisions as members of angel groups but in the context of the group’s operating 
and decision making procedures and hence are potentially influenced by the gatekeeper and 
other group members. A key distinction between solo angels and angel groups is that a 
significant proportion of the investments made by angel groups are follow-on investments 
(Mason et al, 2016; Mason, 2019). This follow-on investment decision – which is likely to be 
distinctive from the initial investment decision, not least because information asymmetries 
are reduced - has not been studied in an angel context. We consider how the post-investment 
stage differs between individual angels and angel groups. Finally, we suggest that the 
emergence of angel groups has implications for the funding escalator model of 
entrepreneurial finance.  
 
2.  THE EMERGENCE OF ANGEL GROUPS: SCALE AND DRIVERS 
The Band of Angels, which was founded in Silicon Valley in 1995, is generally – but 
inaccurately - regarded as the first organised group to be formed. Others, such as Tech Coast 
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Angels (1997), Sierra Angels (1997), Common Angels (1997) and The Dinner Club (1999), 
soon followed (Preston 2007). Archangel Investors, located in Edinburgh, Scotland, was 
founded in 1992, and so is older than these better-known US groups (Kemp et al, 2017). 
Between 1996 and 2006 the number of identifiable business angel groups in the US grew 
from 10 to over 250 (Preston 2007). The Angel Capital Association, covering the USA and 
Canada, was created in 2003 for the purposes of knowledge sharing and transfer of best 
practice, research and data collection and representation of the angel community with policy-
makers. ACA currently has more than 400 angel groups in its database.1 There has been a 
similar expansion in the angel market in Europe. The UK Business Angel Association 
(UKBAA) has 49 angel groups as members.2 There are now examples of angel groups 
throughout the world (May and Liu, 2015; Lo, 2016; Harrison, 2017). There is also evidence 
of the specialisation of groups by industry sector (e.g. health care, clean tech), type of 
investor (e.g. women-only angel groups) and affiliation (e.g. university-based groups).  
 
The emergence of angel groups reflects the need for greater                                                                                    
financial resources to make larger investments, including follow-on investments.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Individual angels are rarely involved in making follow-on investments. Traditionally, 
companies that have exhausted their angel investment have had to seek further finance from 
venture capital funds. However, this puts angels in a vulnerable position, notably to dilution, 
on account of the different investment instruments used by venture capital funds. This is 
exacerbated by their inability to make follow-on investments. This vulnerability was 
painfully exposed during the dot.com crash era of the early 2000s when angels, as initial 
investors, were subject to down-rounds, cram-downs and write-offs of the investments that 
they had made in the dot.com boom at over-inflated values at the hands of venture capital 
                                                          
1 https://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/faqs/  
2 The UKBAA has 160 members including accelerators and incubators, crowdfunding platforms, professional 
advisory firms, early stage venture capital firms  as well as angel groups and individual angels. 
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funds. As a consequence, many angels have sought to avoid investing alongside venture 
capitalists (GP Capital, 2004; Mason, 2007). Moreover, the ability of individual angels to 
pass on their investee businesses to venture capital funds to make follow-on investments has 
declined as venture capitalists have shifted their focus to larger investments. The outcome is 
that angels have recognised the need to band together to create the ‘deep pockets’ needed to 
make both sizeable initial investments and follow-on investments.  In some specific contexts, 
such as Scotland (Harrison et al 2010; Gregson et al, 2013; Harrison 2017), policy-makers 
have sought to encourage the creation of angel groups, for example through specialist support 
agencies and the creation of co-investment funds, as means of addressing gaps in the supply 
of scale-up capital. 
 
Angel groups are also attractive to individual investors by enabling them to achieve more 
diversified investment portfolios (i.e. investing, say, £100,000 across five businesses 
alongside other investors rather than investing it in one business as a solo investor.) Gregson 
et al (2017) highlight the need for angels to make multiple investments in view of the high 
risk of such investments: their analysis demonstrates that “portfolios with more than 50 
investments are required to significantly minimize risk of poor returns. …  Similar scale is 
[also] required to maximize returns potential, as smaller portfolios also have a lower average 
IRR”. Other benefits from joining angel groups include superior deal flow, enabling 
individual angels to invest in particular opportunities that they could never have invested in 
on their own, learning from other investors, providing more effective post-investment 
support, improving their own investment skills and social benefits from opportunities for 
camaraderie with like-minded individuals. 
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The emergence of angel groups is regarded as beneficial to the entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
First, they reduce search costs for both angels and entrepreneurs. Because of the fragmented 
nature of the angel market and the invisibility of angels there was no mechanism for them to 
receive a steady flow of investment opportunities. Instead, they found their deals by chance 
or through their own, often limited, social networks. The entrepreneur’s search for angel 
finance was equally a hit-or-miss affair. As a consequence, investors and entrepreneurs both 
incurred high search costs. This prompted many to drop out of the market as either suppliers 
or seekers of finance (Wetzel, 1981). Angel groups, in contrast, are generally visible and so 
entrepreneurs are able to approach them directly. A further source of inefficiency was that 
each investment made by an investor has typically been a one-off that was screened, 
evaluated and negotiated separately. Angel groups have been able to develop efficient 
routines for handling investment enquiries and screening opportunities and have developed 
standardized investment documents. Angel groups are also more focused on achieving exits 
than are most individual angels (Kerr et al, 2014 – but see Mason and Botelho, 2016,  for 
contrary evidence) 
 
Second, angel groups have stimulated the supply-side of the market. As well as being 
attractive to active angels they also offer considerable attractions for high net worth 
individuals (HNWIs) who want to invest in emerging companies but lack the time, referral 
sources, investment skills or the ability to add value  to be able to invest on their own.  . 
Without the opportunity to invest in emerging companies these investors will invest in other 
asset classes (e.g. stocks, bonds and other investment products, property) (Mason and 
Harrison, 2000). Moreover, such investments are likely to involve money being exported 
from local and regional economies whereas business angels typically invest locally 
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(Avdeitchikova, 2009; Harrison, et al, 2010). Moreover, angels who are members of angel 
groups invest a higher proportion of their wealth than those who are not (Bonini et al, 2018). 
 
Third, the ability of angel groups to add value to their investments is also much greater. The 
range of business expertise that is found amongst angel syndicate members means that in 
most circumstances they are able to contribute much greater value-added to investee 
businesses than that of an individual business angels, or even most early stage venture capital 
funds. Both Kerr et al (2014) and Lerner et al (2018) report that angel groups enhance the 
outcomes and performance of the firms in which they invest. 
 
Fourth, angel groups have become important investment partners with governments. In recent 
years Government intervention in the venture capital market has shifted from direct 
investment to models that involve collaborating with private investors, both to leverage their 
expertise and to eliminate the overhead costs of running their own investment funds (Murray, 
2007; Jääskeläinen and Murray, 2007). One example is the creation by government of co-
investment funds which invest alongside business angel groups, and in some cases early stage 
venture capital funds, matching their investment on a one-to-one basis, typically on a parri 
passu basis, to address the early stage funding gaps (Malcolm Watson Consulting, 2016; 
Owen and Mason, 2017; Harrison, 2017).                                      
 
3. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES – WHO IS A BUSINESS ANGEL? 
Angel research suffers from definitional ambiguity and confusion (Mason and Harrison, 
2008; Mason, 2016).  The emergence of angel groups has added to this. A key source of this 
ambiguity is that the terms ‘angels’ and ‘informal investors’ have often been used 
interchangeably.  However, they are not the same. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
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(GEM), for example, defines informal investors much more broadly to include investments 
from family, friends, acquaintances as well as ‘strangers’.  The term ‘angel’ defines high net 
worth individuals who make their own investment decision, invest their own money, along 
with their time and expertise, directly in businesses in which they have no family connection, 
and, after making the investment, generally takes an active involvement in the business, for 
example, as an advisor or member of the board of directors (Mason, 2006). Definitional 
issues arise because some angel groups are structured in such a way that they attract new 
types of investors who play a much more passive role and hence do not meet these criteria. 
Specifically, they may not be actively involved in the investment decision-making process 
and they may not be a hands-on investors. Hence, paradoxically, it should not be assumed 
that all of the members of every angel groups actually meet the conventional definition of an 
angel investor.  
 
Further confusion arises on account of the various terms that have been used for collective 
forms of angel investing. These include groups, networks, portals, syndicates and 
associations.  We use the term ‘angel group’ which we define as a consortium of individual 
angels who collaborate to manage deal flow and process deals together but make their own 
individual investment decisions. This point is critical:  angel groups are not pooled 
investment vehicles.3  Management may be hired or provided by the group themselves, often 
as volunteers. Larger groups also have their own administrative staff. Angel groups operate 
with differing levels of formality and structure but all have an identity and name and most 
have a web presence (web site, Twitter, Facebook, blogs, etc). ‘Network’ has generally been 
used as shorthand for ‘business angel networks’ (also termed as ‘business introduction 
services’), organisations that operate as mechanisms that connect investors with 
                                                          
3 However, some angel groups have established investment funds alongside their direct investment  activity 
(e.g. London Business Angels: https://investment.newable.co.uk/)  
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entrepreneurs seeking finance (Harrison and Mason, 1996). Bonini et al (2018) contrast 
networks with groups: compared to groups, networks have less stringent obligations and 
engagement rules on its members and provide little or no organised processing of investment 
opportunities, with individual members responsible for finding their own co-investors with 
whom they can share the due diligence, undertaking their own negotiations and producing 
their own term sheet. Sohl (2007) used the term ‘portal’, which carries an implication of on-
line activity (an early example of which was the Small Business Adminstration’s ACE-Net 
electronic angel/entrepreneur matching service launched in 1996: Acs and Tarpley, 1997; 
other examples include Angel List (USA), Angel Investment Network, Angel’s Den and 
London Business Angels (all UK based)). ‘Syndicates’ refers to deals in which several 
independent investors come together to invest together in a specific company. ‘Associations’ 
is the term for a member organisation of angel groups (such as ACA, NACO, EBAN and 
UKBAA)4. Typically the membership of these organisations has extended beyond angel 
groups to include early stage venture capital funds, business accelerators, electronic funding 
platforms (including crowdfunding platforms) and other early stage market players (e.g. law 
firms) (see note 2). 
 
4.  DATA 
The emergence of angel groups is widely thought to overcome the data challenges that have 
traditionally confronted research because of their public profile and the visibility of their 
investments, in contrast to the invisibility of the vast majority of solo business angels and 
their investments.  We argue that this is not necessarily the case, with an over-reliance on 
data from angel groups creating potential new sources of bias in angel research. 
 
                                                          
4 ACA – Angel Capital Association; NACO – National Angel Capital Association (of Canada), EBAN – European 
Business Angel Network; UKBAA – United Kingdom Business Angel Association. 
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4.1 Sampling issues          
The invisible nature of business angel investing has created challenges for researchers, 
resulting in the use of ad hoc, convenience samples (Mason and Harrison, 2008; Mason, 
2016). Angels who are members of groups are at least semi-visible to researchers (although 
may need the co-operation of gatekeepers to access them) and so offer a ‘sample of 
convenience’. As a consequence, several recent studies have drawn their samples of angels 
from the membership of angel groups, and in some cases from just one angel group. (e.g. 
Mitteness et al, 2012a; 2012b; 2016; Kerr et al, 2014; Murnieks et al, 2015; Lerner et al, 
2015; Carpentier and Suret, 2015; Cardon et al, 2018)  But this begs the question whether 
angels who join angel groups are ‘distinctive’? If so, then it may be problematic to 
extrapolate the findings from such studies to the entire angel market or to make comparisons 
with prior research based on solo angels. There is evidence that younger angels are more 
likely to join angel groups when they start investing whereas older angels - because there 
were fewer angel groups when they started their investing career - have only subsequently 
joined angel groups (Botelho, 2017). Moreover, excluding those who join women-only angel 
groups, women are somewhat less likely than men to be members of angel groups (Harrison 
et al, 2018). The generalisability of studies that are based on angels from a single angel group 
is particularly problematic on account of the heterogeneity of groups, with several that focus 
on distinct communities and have particular investment foci. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
A further concern arises from the use of snowball sampling which has been a common 
methodology to overcome the invisibility of business angels (Mason, 2016). As snowball 
surveys are based on the networks of an initial sample they may simply produce samples that 
are dominated by angels from the same group (and hence several individual respondents may 
be reporting on the same investments).  Hence, whereas the visibility of angels that has 
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resulted from the emergence of angel groups might be seen as being beneficial to researchers, 
if those angels who are members of groups are distinctive then it may not be legitimate to 
generalise the findings to the overall market, or even beyond the specific group context.  
 
4.2 Data issues 
A further apparent benefit for researchers arising from the emergence of angel groups is that 
their investments are now captured by various investment databases, such as Crunchbase, 
Pitchbook, CB Insights, Owler and Beauhurst. This enables researchers to undertake 
quantitative analysis of angel investing in a similar way to how venture capital fund 
investments have been analysed (e.g. Block et al, 2018; Croce et al, 2018), but yet again the 
limited coverage of this data raises concerns of biased coverage.  For example, only 17 of the 
21 Scottish angel groups listed on the LINC Scotland web site are included in the Crunchbase 
database.  More signficantly, the coverage of their investments is patchy. For example, 
Archangels a major Scottish angel group, has made 83 investments to 31 March 2017 (Kemp 
et al, 2017) whereas Crunchbase reports only 39 investments to November 2018. Discovery 
Investment Fund, another Scottish angel group, lists nine investments in its portfolio whereas 
Crunchbase lists only one investment.  
          
5. THE INVESTMENT DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
Business angel groups have transformed the investment process.  Research on how business 
angels make their investment decisions has identified various stages that are undertaken 
sequentially: (i) awareness of the investment opportunity; (ii) investor-specific screen, (iii) 
generic screening, (iv) detailed evaluation, (v) contract stage, (vi) closing, (vii) post-
investment support,  (viii) exit (Mason and Botelho, 2018).  Solo angels undertake all of these 
stages themselves. However, the creation of angel groups has resulted in the emergence of a 
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new actor – the group manager or ‘gatekeeper’ (Paul and Whittam, 2010). Their role varies 
between groups but primarily they perform two functions. First, they perform external-facing 
roles, notably promoting the group and attracting deal flow. Second, they normally undertake 
the initial screening of investment opportunities. The individual group members then consider 
these pre-screened deals in more detail. 
 
There is considerable research on the investment screening stage (see reviews by Edelman et 
al, 2017 and Tenca et al, 2018). The process is rather different in angel groups where the 
gatekeeper normally undertakes the initial screening on behalf of the individual angels who 
are members of the groups. The question that arises from the involvement of gatekeepers is 
whether they perform the screening performance differently to that of solo angels.  An initial 
study suggests that there are differences (Mason and Botelho, 2017). First, gatekeepers are 
slower to say ‘no’. They spend longer than solo angels on the screening. Second, their 
screening is less personalized. Personal – often idiosyncratic – issues are prominent in the 
screening by individual angels (Harrison and Mason 2017). In contrast, the gatekeepers place 
considerable emphasis on the group’s investment criteria – these are typically few in number 
and dominated by industry sector, the size of the investment and the likelihood of future 
funding rounds being required. Within these constraints they are open to considering a wide 
range of opportunities, not least because of the collective expertise of the group that they can 
draw upon and their wide range of experience. Third, gatekeepers give considerably greater 
emphasis to the financial aspects of the proposal, not just in terms of the frequency of 
comments but also in terms of the issues raised, notably valuation, the need for future funding 
rounds and returns. Those entrepreneurs whose opportunities pass the gatekeeper’s screening 
might then be invited to pitch to the group.  Fourth, those opportunities that attract sufficient 
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interest from investors will then be subject to due diligence that is typically undertaken by a 
small group of angels. 
 
Another way in which the emergence of angel groups has changed the investment decision-
making process is that it provides individual angels with much greater exposure to the 
insights and opinions of others. This includes group interactions, the influence of other 
members of the group and the influence of gatekeeper (Figure 1). However, “people who 
interact with each other regularly tend to think and behave similarly” (Shiller, 1995). The 
growth of angel groups could therefore be leading to the emergence of a ‘community of 
practice’ (Lave and Wenger, 1991) – a collection of practitioners who engage on an ongoing 
basis in the pursuit of some common endeavour. This ongoing engagement results in shared 
thinking  and the development of a repertoire of ideas, ways of doing and resources – 
experiences, stories, tools, ways of addressing recurring problems – and practices that are 
shared to a greater or lesser extent across members (Wenger, 2000). This, in turn, could result 
in a growing standardisation of investment assessment (Mason et al, 2017). 
 
Figure 1.Influences of gatekeeper and other investors on the investment decisions of 
individual angels (source: Mason and Botelho, 2014) 
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There is emerging evidence that membership of an angel group has a discernible effect of the 
investment decision-making of individual angels. Botelho (2017) concludes that membership 
of an angel group “is a discriminatory factor in decision-making cluster studies”. Specifically, 
angels who are members of angel groups make more investments than solo angels, their 
investments exhibit greater diversity, there is less consistency in their decision-making 
criteria and they exhibit greater learning effects. Bonini et al (2018) find that business angels 
who are members of angel groups have different investment practices compared with those 
who are not. 
 
Turning to later stages in the investment process, valuation and contracting have attracted 
very little research. As a consequence, there is no information on whether angel groups take a 
different approach to valuation than individual angels, whether they have different (more 
formal) contacts and contracts, and the types of investment instruments used.  
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Angels are generally patient investors, although this is generally by default rather than 
intention (Harrison et al, 2016), reflecting the fact that most angels do not adopt an exit-
centric approach to investing (Mason et al, 2015).  It might be expected that angel groups 
would take a more professional approach to investing which would involve being more exit-
centric. Surprisingly, this assumption is challenged by the limited evidence available which 
indicates that most angel group gatekeepers are not any more exit-centric than solo angels 
(Mason and Botelho, 2016). 
 
6. FOLLOW-ON INVESTMENT  
Another way in which the emergence of angel groups has fundamentally changed the nature 
of angel investing is their greater financial capacity which enables them to make follow-on 
investment decisions. Indeed, as groups mature an increasing proportion of their investments 
are accounted for by follow-on investments (Mason, 2019). Evidence from Scotland – where 
most of the angel groups are now mature - indicates that between 60% and 80% of angel 
group investments are follow-on (Mason and Harrison, 2015; Mason et al, 2016). These 
investments are critical in enabling its portfolio companies to scale. The follow-on 
investment decision has not been a focus for research. Surprisingly, this topic has also 
attracted very limited attention in the much larger venture capital literature (McCarthy et al, 
1993; Birmingham et al, 2003; Guler, 2007; Devigne et al, 2016), despite its frequency. 
However, it is fundamentally different from the initial investment decision   From an 
escalation of commitment perspective (Staw, 1976), once decision-makers make an initial 
decision to invest in a company the tendency is for them to become very committed and 
ignore subsequent information, particularly negative information when making a further 
decision to deepen the commitment. This has been identified in VC investing (Birmingham et 
al, 2013; Devigne et al, 2016).  
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Business angels might be expected to be particularly susceptible to the escalation of 
commitment because of the patient nature of their investments, relationship approach with the 
entrepreneur and their ‘committed faith’ in the entrepreneur and business that goes back to 
the circumstances of the initial investment, normally at the start-up stage  when tangible 
evidence was usually lacking (Gregson et al, 2013). Key questions include the following. 
How is the follow-on investment decision initiated and by whom? What are the investment 
criteria – how have they changed from the initial investment decision: is the ‘jockey’ (i.e. 
entrepreneur) still critical, or has the ‘horse’ (i.e. business attributes) become more significant 
(Mitteness et al, 2012a; Harrison and Mason, 2017)? How often and in what circumstances is 
a ‘no’ decision made? How does the prior relationship influence – for good or bad – the 
follow-on investment decision?  And what biases and heuristics underlie the follow-on 
decision process (Harrison et al, 2015)? Can we identify individual characteristics linked to 
escalation of commitment? And are angel groups more likely to invest alongside other 
investors in a follow-on round? 
 
A key consequence of the growth of follow-on investments is that it undermines the 
traditional ‘funding escalator” that dominated the era of solo angels. Benjamin and Margulis 
(1996: 71) describe this relationship as follows: “It boils down to this. Angel investment runs 
the critical first leg of the relay race, passing the baton to venture capital only after a 
company has begun to fund its stride. Venture capitalists focus ... on expansion and later 
stages of development, when their contribution is most effective.”  Several studies provide 
empirical confirmation of this relationship (Freear and Wetzel 1989; 1990; Harrison and 
Mason, 2000; Madill et al, 2005). For example, Freer and Wetzel (1990) who observed that 
“[angels] and venture capital funds play complementary rather than competing roles in the 
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financing of NTBFs”, with angels investing earlier and smaller amounts than venture capital 
firms. However, Hellman et al (2017) find little evidence that businesses financed either by 
individual angels or angel groups go on to raise venture capital.  
 
It has been suggested that a new pattern of funding is emerging (Mason, 2018). Angel groups 
are typically not involved at the pre-start up and seed stages because they have a minimum 
size of investment below which it is uneconomic for them to invest. New sources of seed 
finance have emerged, notably accelerators and incubators as well as crowdfunding, to invest 
in pre-start and start-ups. Angel groups invest at the next stage, typically co-investing with 
other investors, including other angel groups and public sector co-investment funds, to 
provide their investee businesses with sufficient financial runway to grow and exit.  Only 
businesses with significant financial needs would go on to raise further finance from venture 
capital funds. However, in some cases a round of venture capital might be raised prior to the 
exit, capitalising on their greater expertise in achieving exits. The outcome is a bifurcation of 
the risk capital market, with angel groups now increasingly the only source of funding for 
new and emerging businesses seeking investments in the range £250,000 to £1 million (up to 
$1m in the USA: Sohl, 2012). One of the key research issues that arises from this new model 
of entrepreneurial finance is to understand the interactions between business angel groups and 
other investors, notably equity crowdfunding platforms (Wallmeroth et al, 2018), both those 
seed investors who have invested prior to the angel group’s investment and also those making 
follow-on investments. 
 
7. POST-INVESTMENT ROLES 
A key feature of business angels is that they provide ‘smart’ money, using their human and 
social to support their investee companies in a variety of informal and formal roles, including 
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advice, mentoring and networking, as well performing specific functional roles and board 
members or chair of the board (Politis, 2008; 2016). In the angel group context several angels 
will have invested in a business. This raises various questions. Who undertakes these value-
added roles? Is it just one investor, and if so, how is this investor selected? Or do several 
group members contribute to hands-on activity? If multiple angels do invest then this has 
implications for the study of angel-entrepreneur relationships, which typically adopt a dyadic 
focus. If the group’s hands-on role is limited to a core group of angels, does this create band-
width issues, which either limits their investment capacity or their ability to add value? 
Linking back to an earlier point on the types of individuals that angel groups attract, are all 
members of angel groups equally capable of adding value? Or, is it the case that angel groups 
simply attract “inexperienced wealthy individuals seeking a passive investment rather than 
active angels who can contribute value added to their investee businesses” (Sohl 2007)? How 
does the hands-on contribution of angel groups compare with than of individual angels? And  
do different models of angel group influence the type of value-added contribution? 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
The world that scholars study is dynamic. Too often researchers are slow to recognise change 
and adjust their research focus accordingly. The consequence is that the current stock of 
knowledge becomes increasingly divorced from the way in which practice is evolving. This is 
what is happening in business angel research. The knowledge base that has been built up over 
the past 40 years reflects almost entirely the study of individual angels who, for most of this 
period, operated below the radar, investing on their own or informally with a few friends and 
business associates, making their own investment decisions, investing small amounts of 
money per investment, drawing upon their own entrepreneurial experience to support their 
investee businesses, and adopting a fairly passive approach to an exit. However, the way in 
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which angel investing has changed. Part of the angel market is now visible, and more 
structured and institutionalised, occurring through managed angel groups. This changes the 
nature of the supply of entrepreneurial finance, challenges the traditional definition of an 
angel investor, and changes the way in which the investment process occurs. In this paper we 
have argued that business angel research needs to address this changing context. We identify 
seven research priorities.  
 
First, angel groups have drawn new types of investors into angel investing. However, our 
profile of angels as late middle-aged men with an entrepreneurial background who make a 
post-investment value-added contribution to their investee companies remains heavily 
influenced by research based on solo angels. A key priority, therefore, is research that 
provides a profile of the contemporary angel population, updating the ABC (attitudes, 
behaviours and characteristics) studies that have been a prominent feature of angel research 
(White and Dumay 2017).  
 
Second, from a methodological perspective, the changing nature of business angels means 
that it may not be appropriate to base research on samples drawn from angel groups 
(particularly samples from a single group) and assume that the evidence is comparable to 
prior evidence based on solo angels or can be generalised across the business angel 
population. 
 
Third, the implications of the emergence of angel groups on the supply of entrepreneurial 
finance needs to be assessed. This is generally regarded as a positive development, notably by 
attracting new investors and thereby expanding the supply of early stage finance. This is 
particularly significant in economically lagging regions which have a deficiency of 
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experienced angel investors (a consequence of the low level of entrepreneurial activity in 
such regions). In such geographical environments angel groups provide a mechanism through 
which this expertise can leverage ‘dumb money’ from high net worth individuals which 
would otherwise be invested in less economically productive asset classes (Mason and 
Harrison, 2000).5 However, concern has also been raised that the emergence of angels groups 
is resulting in the institutionalisation of angel investing, which is becoming more like venture 
capital funds or fund management companies, investing money from passive investors (Sohl, 
2012). Indeed, some angel groups have established separate investment funds while others 
have evolved into fund managers (Gregson et al, 2013). This raises the question whether “the 
essence of angel investing being lost with the emergence of angel groups.”6   
 
Fourth, there is a need to capture the heterogeneity of angel groups, documenting both the 
types of angels they recruit and the various organisational and operational models, and the 
implications that these different models have on their investment activity. There is also a 
need to understand the evolution of angel groups – their membership, deal flow (including 
referral sources), investment focus, investment processes, post-investment support and 
outcomes. And are there geographical differences in the organisation and investment 
approach of angel groups? 
 
Fifth, there is a need to understand the different nature of the investment decision-making 
process and criteria of angel groups. Specifically, how much influence does the 
manager/gatekeeper have on the investment decision? What role do individual angels play in 
the investment decision. How is the investment decision made? Where are angel groups 
                                                          
5 We are grateful to David Grahame, OBE,  Executive Director, LINC Scotland for this point. 
6 This was a comment made by an angel investor in an interview with the lead author. 
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positioned on the market risk (the concern of venture capitalists) - agency risk (the concern of 
angels) spectrum (Fiet, 1995)?  
 
Sixth, what are the implications of angel groups for entrepreneurial finance policy? Tax 
incentives are predicated on incentivising individual investors, but this may constrain the 
investment decision making and modus operandi of angel groups. More recently, co-
investment funds – public sector investment vehicles that invest alongside angel groups – are 
emerging as a significant area for government intervention  (Growth Analysis, 2013; Owen 
and Mason, 2017; Bileau et al, 2017; Harrison, 2018).  However, there is only limited 
evidence on the variety of operating models of co-investment funds, approaches to evaluation 
(Murray et al, 2015) and impact.  
 
And finally, what level of interaction do angel groups have with the growing number of other 
players in the entrepreneurial finance market, and what is the nature of such interactions? 
Specifically, to what extent are angel groups investing in businesses that have raised start-up 
finance from incubators and other providers of seed capital?  How much interaction do angel 
groups have with venture capital funds? And, what effect is equity crowdfunding, a 
potentially disruptive market innovation, having on the nature and role of angel investing? 
Specifically, how are angel groups interacting with equity crowdfunding platforms? What 
investment models are emerging (Saloman, 2019)? How does co-investing between angel 
groups and other types of investor occur? 
 
Angel investing has been and continues to be central to the development of an entrepreneurial 
economy across a range of geographies. As angel investing internationalises (Harrison 2017), 
especially into emerging economies (May and Liu 2016; Lo 2016), effective and relevant 
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research and evidence-based policy making needs to be grounded in the new realities of 
business angel investing that we have described in this paper. 
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